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Abstract 
Humans possess two nonverbal systems capable of representing numbers, both limited in their 
representational power: the first one represents numbers in an approximate fashion, and the 
second  one  conveys  information  about  small  numbers  only.  Conception  of  exact  large 
numbers  has  therefore  been  thought  to  arise  from  the  manipulation  of  exact  numerical 
symbols. Here, we focus on two fundamental properties of the exact numbers, as prerequisites 
to the concept of exact numbers: the fact that all numbers can be generated by a successor 
function, and the fact that equality between numbers can be defined in an exact fashion. We 
discuss  some  recent  findings  assessing  how  speakers  of  Mundurucu  (an  Amazonian language),  and  young  western  children  (3-4  years  old)  understand  these  fundamental 
properties of numbers. 
 
1. Roots of Human Numerical Competences 
Our numerical competences have been grounded on two core cognitive systems, shared 
with animals and possibly present from birth. On one hand, animals, and preverbal infants 
aged at least 4 ½ months represent numbers in the format of analogical internal magnitudes 
(Dehaene, 1997; Cantlon & Brannon, 2006; Dehaene, 2007). One characteristic of the internal 
magnitude system is that it represents numbers only in an approximate fashion, and more 
specifically follows the Weber's law: the extent to which two numbers can be discriminated 
depends on their ratio (Xu & Spelke, 2000; Feigenson, 2007; Nieder & Miller, 2003). Besides 
human infants and animals, instances of Weber's law for numbers have also been reported in 
occidental adults (Piazza et al., 2004; Whalen et al., 1999), and in remote populations, who 
have  not  received  any  formal  education  in  mathematics,  and  speak  a  language  with  a 
restricted numerical lexicon (Gordon, 2004; Pica et al., 2004). 
In  addition  to  the  internal  magnitude  system,  infants  may  also  be  able  to  use  their 
attentional resources to extract numerical information from displays containing only a small 
number of objects. Like adults, infants can track several objects in parallel (up to 3), and they 
are thought to engage attentional indexes to do so, pointing to the objects to track (Feigenson 
et al., 2004; Carey, 2004). Although attentional indexes do not encode numerical information 
in an explicit way, they can convey some numerical information, because the number of 
indexes  engaged  corresponds  to  the  number  of  items  in  a  display.  Implicit  numerical 
information of this kind can be sufficient to solve a variety of numerical tasks: for instance, it 
can support infants' ability to form accurate expectations of how many objects have been hidden behind an occluder, and to update their expectations whenever an object is either 
added or subtracted (Simon, 1999; Uller et al., 1999). However, the role this system plays in 
development has been debated (Gelman and Butterworth, 2005 vs LeCorre and Carey, 2007); 
in particular, it is not clear yet how the implicit numerical informations conveyed by the 
attentional resources can eventually be integrated with analog numerical representations. 
 
2.  Contrasting  Natural  Integers  with  Preverbal  Representations  of 
Quantity 
Although natural integers are the target of world-wide numerical symbol systems (Ifrah & 
Bellos 2000), and constitute the ground of mathematical theories of numbers, they cannot be 
grasped  by  the  core  systems  on  which  understanding  of  numbers  is  rooted.  The  object 
tracking system is sensitive to exact numerosities, but it is limited by the number of indexes 
available, which seems to be around 3 or 4. On the other hand, the internal magnitude system 
encodes numbers only in an approximate way, such that as quantities increase, representations 
become more and more confuse, thus making exact discrimination of numbers impossible.  
Natural integers possess several properties which distinguish them fundamentally from a 
representation of approximate quantities. In particular, two different properties of the integers 
have been highlighted by philosophers and mathematicians as possible starting points to give 
a formal definition of the integers. The definition of cardinal integers, by Frege or Russell, 
capitalizes on the property of exact equality between numbers, which is instantiated through 
one-to-one  correspondence.  On  the  other  hand,  Peano  derived  ordinal  integers  from  a 
successor  function,  which  he  applied  recursively.  Both  definitions  target  the  same 
mathematical object: thus, either property (exact equality or successor function) is sufficient 
to  define  the  integers,  and  each  of  these  two  properties  implies  the  other.  In  fact,  both properties are equivalent to the existence of a minimal quantity, ONE, which also corresponds 
to the minimal distance between two numbers. 
However, neither of these fundamental properties can be defined on a set of approximate 
numerical  representations.  When  numbers  are  represented  approximately  via  internal 
magnitudes,  there  is  no  restriction  on  the  possible  values  taken  by  the  magnitude 
representation. Indeed, to explain the occurrence of Weber's law, models of the representation 
of  internal  magnitudes  have  introduced  some  source  of  noise  into  the  representation 
(Dehaene, 2007; Gallistel & Gelman, 2000).  As a consequence, the magnitude corresponding 
to a given number does not always take a fixed value, but is distributed around an average 
value, with the possibility to take any value in a continuous interval. Consequently, equality 
between magnitudes can only be defined approximately: magnitudes are declared equal when 
they  are  close  enough.  Also,  because  there  is  no  closest  neighbour  to  a  given  value  for 
continuous magnitudes, it is impossible to define the notion of a unique successor number or 
to order all the values of the magnitudes in a discrete list. 
3. Theories of the Development of Exact Numbers 
How  do  children  overcome  the  limitations  imposed  by  their  core  systems  of  numeric 
representations, and finally grasp the concept of exact numbers? Even if the properties of 
exact equality between numbers, and of the existence of a successor for each number, derive 
logically  from  each  other,  they  may  not  be  acquired  simultaneously.  It  is  possible  that 
children grasp the notions of exact equality and succession independently, and from different 
sources,  and  then  integrate  these  initial  pieces  of  knowledge  to  derive  full-blown  exact 
number concepts. 
Different theories have been proposed to account for children's acquisition of exact number 
concepts. Here, because our goal is to assess the acquisition of the premises of the concept of integer (the successor function and of the notion of exact equality), rather than the concept of 
integer itself, we focus on the theories that make predictions on these issues.  
According to some theorists (Leslie et al., in press; Gelman and Butterworth, 2005; Gelman 
& Gallistel, 1978), the child possesses an innate system to represent exact numbers. Leslie et 
al give two proposals for the exact nature of that system. Their first proposal centers on an 
innate relation of exact equality: first, children know that the individual items of sets can be 
exchanged without changing the cardinal value of the set; later, they learn that applying the 
same operation (either addition, subtraction, multiplication, or division) to two sets that are 
initially equal conserves equality. Moreover, children know that equality is not maintained 
after additions or subtractions:  In particular, addition or subtraction of one or more items 
changes the cardinal of a set. According to this first proposal, therefore, children have a 
concept of exact equality to start with; the other properties of exact integers, such as the 
successor function, are grasped later. 
Leslie et al. also discuss an alternative scenario, in which children begin with an intuition 
about the successor function. Using the successor function, children could construct a mental 
model of natural integers, akin to a grid, which would have to be calibrated on the internal 
magnitude  system.  This  proposal  capitalizes  on  the  recursion  faculty,  because  the  grid  is 
constructed  by  applying  the  successor  function  recursively.  Leslie  et  al.  do  not  specify 
whether or not the innate exact number representations depend on the language faculty, but 
their second proposal is reminiscent of a hypothesis originally developed by Chomsky, who 
postulated that exact numbers come with the language faculty, and in particular the faculty for 
recursion (Hauser et al. 2002). This hypothesis predicts that only humans should be able to 
grasp  exact  numbers,  because  other  animals  do  not  possess  the  faculty  for  recursion. 
Nevertheless, the competence for exact numbers would not depend on the particular language 
spoken,  and  in  particular  it  would  not  depend  on  the  existence  of  numeral  terms  in  the lexicon.  Rather,  the  apprehension  of  exact  numbers  would  depend  on  the  presence  of 
universal recursive properties of natural language syntax. 
Others have postulated that natural integers do not arise from our innate endowment, but are 
a construction, driven by cultural inputs. One first set of proposals (the bootstrapping theory) 
emphasizes the role of the linguistic symbols, and in particular the verbal counting list (Carey, 
2004; Hurford, 1987; Klahr & Wallace, 1976). According to these theories, the children first 
discover the meanings of small number words (‘one’, ‘two’, ‘three’), which they link to the 
mental models given by their object tracking system. After some practice with the counting 
list, which they have learned to recite in order, children eventually discover the rule ordering 
number words in the counting list: two is one more than one, and three is one more than two. 
At this point, they hypothesize that this rule is valid through the entire counting list, and 
generalize  it  to  the  last  counting  words  as  well.  On  this  view,  words  first  serve  as 
placeholders:  children  learn  the  list  of  counting  words  first,  and  give  them  a  numerical 
meaning  only  afterwards,  as  they  infer  the  principle  of  the  successor  number  from  the 
organization  of  the  list.  Concepts  of  exact  numbers  fully  develop  later,  on  the  basis  of 
children’s  earlier-developing  knowledge  of  the  successor  principle.  In  this  view,  the 
organization of number words in a list is crucial: in the absence of contact with a counting list 
(be it in a linguistic or non-linguistic format), exact number concepts would not develop. 
A  third alternative account focuses on the conception of exact equality through one-to-one 
correspondence (Mix et al., 2002), as a precursor to conceiving exact numbers. Children can 
manage  situations  of  one-to-one  correspondence,  for  example  when  distributing  objects 
among people ("one for me, one for you"), or when they use their attentional indexes to track 
individuals  and  assess  numerical  equivalence  between  sets.  According  to  this  account, 
children are progressively driven to differentiate the quantification of discrete numbers on one 
hand,  and  the  quantification  of  continuous  amount  on  the  other  hand  (the  only  type  of quantification made possible by approximate magnitude representations), by realizing that 
one-to-one correspondence applies to the former but not to the latter. Based on this account, 
we  could  imagine  exact  numbers  to  derive  from  the  understanding  of  one-to-one 
correspondence, with no role for the language. In this case, exact number concepts would be 
universal among all human beings, and shared by any animal species that can understand one-
to-one correspondence. 
4. Young Children’s Performances in Numeric Tasks 
While  they  still  have  access  to  both  approximate  representations  of  numerosities  and 
attentional models of sets for small numbers, toddlers start to acquire the numerical symbols 
for natural integers. Number words are part of children's very early vocabulary. From the age 
of 2, children learn to recite the beginning of the counting list, and start to count arrays of 
items, with an increasing proficiency (Fuson, 1988). However, their understanding of the 
meaning of the number words is limited, as revealed by the Give-A-Number task (Wynn, 
1990). At an age when they are able to recite the counting list up to 10 items, children are 
surprisingly unable to hand a set of two objects to an experimenter, when probed to do so 
verbally. Instead of conforming to the instructions and produce sets of 2, 3, 4 or more objects, 
children simply grab a bunch of objects and give them to the experimenter, with no relation 
between the number given and the number requested. With age, they successively learn to 
produce sets of 1, 2, 3, and 4 objects with consistency; still they do not use counting to do so. 
While learning about the small number words, they still give an invariable quantity for all the 
larger number words. For example, if a child has learned to give sets of 1 and 2 objects 
accurately, she will give on average the same number of objects for sets of more than 2 
objects, but the number of objects given will invariably be larger than 2. Children's pattern of 
performance at the Give-a-number task is not isolated. The same pattern is observed in a production task, called What's-On-This-Card, where children are asked to describe a series of 
cards depicting arrays of objects (LeCorre et al., 2006). 
These  two  tasks  indicate  that  younger  children  seem  to  attribute  an  undifferentiated 
meaning to all the larger number words, as if all number words meant ‘a lot’. Because these 
children know the meaning of a few small number words only, and do not use counting 
productively, this state of knowledge is referred to as ‘subset-knower’ or ‘non-counter’ in the 
literature. 
More than one year after they have started to learn counting, at the age of 3 ½, children 
become able to produce sets for any number in their counting range in the Give-A-Number 
task,  and  to  quantify  arrays  correctly  in  the  What's-On-This-Card  task.  At  this  age,  they 
systematically apply counting to these situations. Interestingly, after this step, they start to use 
counting not only for large numbers, but even for the smallest numbers, where they used to 
succeed by grasping the objects all at once. Because they show a flexible use of the counting 
procedure, these children are called ‘counters’ or ‘counting principle knowers’ (CP-knowers) 
in the literature. 
The exact nature of the insight that children experience when they reach the state of CP-
knower is unclear. In order to understand it better, we need to determine what children know 
just before this insight, what triggers it, and also what they finally derive from their newly 
acquired numeric competences. In particular, even if children start using number words in a 
way that it consistent with exact numbers, they might not have constructed fully consistent 
integer concepts by then. They understand that counting gives a good answer to the question 
‘how many’, because it gives a good answer in the case of small numbers, but still they might 
not  understand  that  it  gives  the  only  possible  answer.  Children  may  develop  a  full 
understanding  of  exact  number  concepts  (including  understanding  of  the  notion  of  exact 
equality, and of succession) in the course of their further practise with counting. Alternatively, it might be necessary for children to develop at least some aspects of the concept of exact 
numbers before they can get to a fuller understanding of counting and of the number words. In 
this case, either a prior knowledge of the principles of exact equality, or of the successor 
function,  or  both,  would  be  necessary  for  children  to  realize  how  counting  gives  an 
assessment of quantity. 
4.1 Children’s knowledge of the successor principles 
Evidence  shows  that  children  develop  some  knowledge  of  the  successor  principles  just 
before they become CP-Knowers (Sarnecka & Carey, in prep), therefore understanding the 
successor  function  might  act  as  trigger  for  the  counting  insight.  Sarnecka  and  Gelman 
presented children with two trays containing the same quantity of marbles, while announcing 
them how many marbles were on each plate ("look, here I have 5 marbles, and here I have 5 
marbles as well"). Then, in full view of the child, they took one marble on one plate, and 
added it to the other plate. At the end of this transformation, they asked the child to indicate 
which plate contained six or four marbles. To succeed at this test, children need to have 
uncovered at least one aspect of how the successor function is instantiated in the counting list: 
they need to know that the word that appears just after (or before) a given numeral in the 
counting list refers to a larger (or smaller) quantity. Both CP-knowers and advanced subset-
knowlers choose correctly between the two alternatives.  Thus,  having a partial knowledge of 
the successor function might act as a trigger for children to make the step towards becoming a 
CP-knower. In a second experiment, Sarnecka and Carey studied a different aspect of the 
successor function: they evaluated whether children know that going to the next word in the 
count list corresponds to the addition of only one object, as opposed to several objects. Only 
CP-knowers were able to solve this second task, suggesting that late subset-knowers have 
only a limited understanding of how the counting list instantiates the successor function. In fact, even CP-knowers do not always use number words in a way that is consistent with 
an  understanding  of  the  successor  principle,  and  its  immediate  consequence  that  number 
words appearing later in the counting list correspond to larger numbers. LeCorre and Carey 
(2007) asked children to estimate the number of objects in an array, rapidly and without 
counting. They observed a further distinction among CP-knowers, between mappers, whose 
responses increased with the numerosity of stimuli, and non-mappers, who did not. Therefore, 
even if children start to understand some aspects of the successor principles before they can 
use counting productively, they do not derive the full consequences of this principle until 
several months after they become CP-knowers. 
4.2 Children’s knowledge of the exact equality principles 
A pioneer in the investigation of the child’s concept of number, Piaget carried out and 
inspired extensive research on children’s understanding of one-to-one correspondence, which 
indicated that children aged 2 to 5 fail to rely on a formerly established relation of one-to-one 
correspondence to assess the numerical equality between two sets, as soon as the elements of 
one set have been moved. Instead, these children rely on some other non-numerical cues such 
as the extent of the sets (Piaget, 1965). Piaget concluded from his studies that children do not 
conceive numbers before the age of 5-7. This interpretation of the results have been contested 
since, based on evidence with children aged 4 and more, who showed that they understood 
that  the  one-to-one  correspondence  relationship  was  conserved  in  some  slightly  modified 
versions of the task, when the design of the experiment minimized misinterpretations of the 
conservation question (Mehler & Bever, 1967; McGarrigle & Donaldson, 1974). Furthermore, 
at  the  age  of  5,  children  interpret  number  words  as  referring  to  exact  numbers,  even  for 
numbers beyond their counting range (Lipton & Spelke, 2005). Finally, 5-year-olds recognize 
that addition and subtraction of the same quantity cancel each other (Gilmore & Spelke, in press). Therefore, a full understanding of the principles of exact equality has developed by the 
age of five. 
Results for younger children are more nuanced. In a first experiment, Sarnecka and Gelman 
showed that subset-knowers as well as CP-knowers considered that the word "six” no longer 
applied  after  the  addition  of  one  object  (Sarnecka  &  Gelman,  2004).  In  this  experiment, 
objects were placed in a box in front of the child, while the experimenter narrated how many 
objects were in the box ("I am putting 6 moons in this box"). Then a transformation occurred 
in full view of the child, where the experimenter either removed or added one object. In 
control trials, the box was shaken. At the end of the transformation, the child was asked how 
many objects the box contained, with a choice between two number words, one being the 
initial word, the other being the correct answer on subtraction or addition trials ("Now, how 
many moons do I have in the box, is it five or is it six?"). Children tended to choose the initial 
word (e.g. ‘six’) when the box had been just shaken, and the alternative number word (e.g. 
‘five’)  after  an  addition  or  a  subtraction.  However,  two  slightly  different  experiments 
attempting to address the same problem yielded contradictory results. The first experiment is 
also reported by Sarnecka and Gelman (2004). Here, children were shown two arrays in one-
to-one correspondence, either containing the same number of objects, or a different number of 
objects, a fact that children easily assessed. Then, the experimenter told them how many 
objects the first array contained, and asked them about the quantity of objects in the second 
array. Children who had correctly judged the arrays to be identical or different on the basis of 
one-to-one  correspondence  performed  at  chance  when  they  had  to  choose  between  an 
identical or different number word. Similarly, Condry and Spelke (2008) observed a failure in 
a slightly more complicated task. Children were given two trays with the same number of 
objects, announcing how many objects were on each plate (eg five). Then, the experimenter 
added one object on one of the two plates. Children were subsequently asked to point to the plate  containing  five  objects  (the  same  number  word)  or  six  objects  (a  different  number 
word). Again, subset-knowers performed at chance in this task. 
Sarnecka and Gelman's first experiment, where children are successful, differs from the two 
other  ones  in  a  crucial  way.  Although  the  whole  arrays  stay  in  full  view  of  children 
throughout the trial in their second experiment as well as in Condry and Spelke's experiment, 
in  their  first  experiment  the  transformation  occurs  while  the  array  is  hidden.  When  the 
children  are  never  shown  the  final  visual  arrays,  their  responses  accord  to  an  exact 
interpretation of the number words. However, when they can perceive the arrays which they 
need to contrast, they do not differentiate the number words, even if the difference between 
the two arrays is evidenced by a one-to-one correspondence setting. In all experiments, the 
two arrays are nevertheless very close in terms of numerosity: they are separated by a ratio of 
5/6,  which  is  hard  to  discriminate  on  the  basis  of  approximate  internal  magnitudes 
representations. It is possible that, when they have to compute the result of the transformation 
themselves,  e.g.  when  the  array  is  hidden,  children  overestimate  the  effect  of  this 
transformation, therefore choose a different number word to qualify the final quantity. Such 
hypothesis would be in line with the fact that adults show a momentum effect which leads 
them  to  overestimate  the  result  of  an  addition  on  non-symbolic  arrays  (and  similarly 
underestimate  the  result  of  a  subtraction)  (McCrink  et  al.,  2007).  At  least,  the  fact  that 
children's performances in choosing a same or different number word depend on the visibility 
of the arrays indicates a limited understanding of which transformation affect number per se, 
independently of their interpretation of the number words. Therefore, subset-knowers appear 
to have a poor knowledge, if any, of the concept of exact equality. 
4.3. A Study of the Concept of Exact Equality 
As stressed before, it is possible that understanding exact equality precedes the acquisition 
of a full-blown natural integer concept, and that exact equality is acquired independently from the notion of successor number, and at different times. In order to test the knowledge of the 
principles of exact equality in 32-36-month-olds, we designed a task where children were 
presented with two sets in a one-to-one correspondence relation, and could use this relation to 
give a judgment of exact equality (Izard et al., in prep). The task was set as a game, where 
children were invited to play with finger puppets. At the beginning of each trial, a set of 5 or 6 
identical puppets were fixed on a tree with 6 branches, creating a one-to-one correspondence 
between the branches and the puppets. Then, the puppets disappeared in an opaque box. After 
some time, puppets were brought back to the branches: the experimenter helped the child to 
get the first 5 puppets and fix them on the tree, and then we recorded whether the child went 
back to search in the box for an extra 6
th puppet. 
In this basic condition, children used the one-to-one correspondence between branches and 
puppets successfully: they searched more when the box was supposed to contain one extra 
puppet (when the set contained 6 puppets) than when it was supposed to be empty (a set of 5 
puppets). In contrast, in a control condition where the tree contained more branches, so that 
one-to-one correspondence cues were not available, children did not discriminate between 
sets of 5 and 6 puppets. 
Additional conditions were designed to test for the children's knowledge of principles of 
exact equality, where some events could happen while the puppets were hidden in the box. In 
a first condition, one extra puppet was added to the box, or one puppet was removed from the 
box. In a second condition, one branch was either added or subtracted from the tree. Finally, 
in  a  third  condition,  one  puppet  was  subtracted  from  the  box,  and  then  was  replaced  by 
another  one.  In  all  these  conditions,  children  performed  at  chance.  Note  that,  since  they 
searched equivalently in trials where the original setting showed an empty branch and in trials 
where there was no empty branch, they did not act as if no transformation had occurred, rather they acted as if they suspected that the outcome might be different from the original setting, 
yet they could not tell what the exact outcome should be.  
Two subsequent tests assessed whether the children's failure could not be explained by 
invoking an extra processing load introduced by the transformation. When tested on small 
numbers  (2-3  puppets  and  branches),  with  the  exact  same  addition/subtraction  scenarios, 
children  were  flawless.  They  also  successfully  solved  another  condition  involving  large 
numbers, where one puppet was taken out of the box and then eventually put back in the box. 
Because these conditions required processing of the same transformations and performance of 
the same response, their contrasting findings suggest that children’s errors in the earlier tasks 
stem from limits to their representation of exact cardinal values. 
In  summary,  these  results  show  that  young  children  aged  2:8  to  3:0  years  have  some 
knowledge of the principles of exact equality, but this knowledge is limited: they know that 
the cardinal of a set stays exactly the same, as long as the items forming the sets do not 
change, and they can use one-to-one correspondence to track the cardinal of a given set. Yet, 
when  the  identity  of  the  items  forming  the  set  is  modified  by  addition,  subtraction,  or 
replacement, they suspect the cardinal might have changed, but they can not discriminate 
within all types of transformations which do or do not change the cardinal of the set. These 
results  reveal  a  larger  understanding  of  one-to-one  correspondence  than  Piaget’s  classical 
conservation task, but less understanding than that proposed by Leslie et al.  These children 
may  begin  with  a  first  level  of  knowledge  which  serves  as  a  trigger  to  understand  the 
principles of exact equality. 
How does knowledge of exact equality relate to the insight enabling a child to become a 
CP-knower? Most of the children tested here were subset-knowers, however, a few (young) 
CP-knowers were also tested and they did not perform better than the other participants. Thus, 
in western children, the acquisition of the principles of exact equality seems to be independent of the discovery of the successor number principle, which is thought to underly the transition 
from the subset-knower to the CP-knower stage.  
5. Another case study: Mundurucu speakers 
In order to test whether knowledge of exact equality principles could develop in the absence 
of practice with counting, we adapted the task to test a different population, the Mundurucus. 
The Mundurucus are an Amazonian indigene group, who for some of them live in relative 
isolation from occidental civilisation. In the most remote locations, for example upstream 
from  the  Cururu  Mission,  most  Mundurucus  do  not  receive  any  formal  education  in 
mathematics (Pica et al., 2004; Dehaene et al., 2006, see also Pica et al. in present volume). 
Numerical terms in  Mundurucu include words corresponding to the small numbers (1-5), 
although this correspondence is only approximate: for example the word ebapũg, which is 
predominantly used for sets of three objects, can also be applied to sets containing 4 or 2 
objects. Larger quantities can sometimes be expressed by combining smaller number words 
(pũg pogbi xepxep bodi, five and two on the other side), or applying a double reduplication to 
a number word (ebapũg pũg pũg: two on both sides, see Pica et al. in this present volume), 
although  comprehension  of  these  phrases  is  effortful  and  not  shared  by  all  speakers.  For 
complex phrases, it is not clear for now whether they refer to exact or approximate quantities, 
but some preliminary data seem to favour the hypothesis of an approximate meaning: when 
shown a given quantity, corresponding to one of these phrases, Mundurucu tended to judge 
that the number word still applied to the quantity after one dot had been added, or subtracted, 
and  even  when  the  quantity  had  been  halved  or  doubled.  However,  such  data  should  be 
regarded with caution, because the effect might have been mostly driven by the majority of 
individuals who have difficulties comprehending these utterances. 
Most Mundurucus, even monolingual speakers, are also able to recite the counting list in 
Portuguese.  However,  only  the  Mundurucus  who  showed  a  high  level  of  proficiency  in Portuguese  judged  Portuguese  number  words  to  refer  to  exact  quantities,  whereas 
monolinguals interpreted the Portuguese number words as referring to approximate quantities: 
they attributed the same meaning to the Portuguese number words as the Mundurucu number 
words. Overall, these preliminary results suggest that most Mundurucu speakers (at least the 
monolingual speakers) do not possess lexical terms to refer to exact quantities.. 
A  computerized  version  of  our  one-to-one  correspondence  task  was  developed  for  the 
Mundurucus (Izard et al., in preparation). In this version, participants were presented with an 
animation which involved sets of red and black puzzle pieces and a can. At the beginning of 
each trial, red and black pieces were presented in one-to-one correspondence, and the can was 
shown to be empty. The black pieces stayed in place during the whole trial, while the red 
pieces  started  to  move,  and  disappeared  inside  the  can.  At  this  point,  a  transformation 
occurred which affected the hidden set of red pieces: some pieces were added, or subtracted, 
or pieces were replaced by other ones. At the end, some of the red pieces came back in front 
of the black pieces, and participants were invited to judge whether the box was empty or not 
by  clicking  on  one  of  two  alternatives.  In  the  first  type  of  trials,  called  exact  trials,  the 
transformations involved only one piece, and the final choice was between an empty can and 
a can containing one piece. Some other trials, called approximate trials, were included in the 
test in order to measure the global level of difficulty of the task. In these approximate trials, 
the transformations involved 5 pieces instead of only one, and the final choice was between 
an empty can and a can containing 5 pieces. Moreover, we also included some extra trials 
involving only small numbers (up to 4 pieces, small number trials), as a second measure of 
the task difficulty.  
Overall,  this  task  was  very  hard  for  the  Mundurucus;  however,  all  groups,  including 
monolingual speakers and children (aged 5-12 years), performed above chance level in the 
exact  trials.  Furthermore,  performances  were  identical  for  the  exact  trials  and  for  the approximate or small number trials. Therefore, the performance levels must be explained not 
by a difficulty to handle exact numbers per se, but by the overall difficulty of the task, which 
required that they track several successive operations over 20 s
1. Moreover, note that for the 
Mundurucus, all the different conditions tested incorporated some sort of transformation, and 
therefore these conditions corresponded to the conditions on which young occidental children 
failed.  We  conclude  from  this  test  that  Mundurucus  understand  the  principles  of  exact 
equality:  they  know  which  transformations  affect  numerosities,  and  they  also  know  that 
cardinal  value  of  a  set  is  not  affected  when  the  identity  of  the  items  forming  the  set  is 
modified. In other words, they know that addition and subtraction compensate each other, so 
that adding one item and then subtracting one results in no change in the number of objects. 
Further tests confirmed that Mundurucu can use the strategy of one-to-one correspondence 
spontaneously, even when it is not given to them in the task setting. Hence, we tested them in 
a match-to-sample task, where they were required to produce a set of seeds to match a number 
of dots presented to them on a screen, or another set of seeds presented on the table. The sets 
produced matched the model on average, with some variability. However, the variability was 
very reduced compared to the predictions of the model of the internal number line, and also 
the distribution was not Gaussian: exact answers were much more frequent than approximate 
answers. Very often, the sets produced contained exactly as much seeds as the model set, 
providing  evidence  that  Mundurucus  used  some  kind  of  exact  strategy  to  solve  the  task. 
Hence, when they were performing the task, they seemed to be silently scanning the items of 
the model set one by one, and grabbing a seed each time they switched to a new item. Similar 
results have been obtained recently with speakers of Piraha, a language with a number lexicon 
even more restricted than Mundurucu (Frank et al., in press), and children from indigene 
populations  in  Australia  (Butterworth  &  Reese,  this  volume),  who  adopted  a  particular strategy  of  matching  the  configuration  of  the  objects  in  order  to  achieve  one-to-one 
correspondence. 
Together, these two tests converge to show that Mundurucus can conceive exact equality 
between numbers, even in the absence of experience with exact number words or of practice 
with counting. However, since the acquisition of the successor function seems to be triggered 
or accelerated by experience with the counting list in western children, it is possible that 
Mundurucu speakers do not understand this property. We did not test a full understanding of 
the successor number principle with the Mundurucus, but studied whether the participants 
who could recite the counting list in Portuguese (but still were monolingual in Mundurucu) 
could compare number words given in Portuguese. The results show no understanding of the 
rule ordering the counting list: whenever one of the two words to be compared was larger than 
5, Mundurucus performed at chance. This result shows that they have no understanding of the 
fact that number words that come later in the counting list refers to larger numbers. Their 
knowledge of the property of successor numbers must be, at best, limited. 
 
Conclusion 
From infancy, two nonverbal systems are available to encode numeric information. A first 
system  represents  approximate  numbers  in  the  form  of  internal  magnitudes.  Furthermore, 
infants possess an attentional mechanism to track objects in sets containing up to 3 items, and 
this second system can give them access to the number of items present in small sets. Natural 
integers  transcend  these  two  types  of  representations:  although  internal  magnitude  are 
approximate, integers are defined exactly, up to the precision of one unit; and although object 
tracking mechanisms are limited to sets of up to 3 objects, natural integers have no limit. We focused on two properties of the natural integers, which distinguish them from a system 
of approximate numerosities, and whose understanding constitutes a prerequisite to a full 
understanding of the concept of exact number. First, equality between integers can be defined 
exactly. Understanding exact equality requires realizing the two following properties: first, 
that addition or subtraction operations, even minimal (involving only one item) change the 
value of an integer; second, that the number of objects in a set is invariant over changes in the 
identity of the objects: in other words, that addition and subtraction can cancel each other. A 
second fundamental property of natural integers, which can not be defined on a system of 
approximate magnitudes, is that each integer has a successor, obtained by the addition of 
ONE; and that by listing all the successive successors, one can enumerate any of the integers. 
Here, we propose that these two aspects of natural integers are acquired independently, and 
from different sources. Manipulation of exact number words, organized as a counting list, 
seems to play a role in occidental children’s understanding the notion of a successor number. 
In young occidental children, the acquisition of a concept of exact equality seems to happen 
later,  and  independently  from,  children's  experience  with  symbols  for  exact  numbers. 
Understanding exact equality could emerge from experience with one-to-one correspondence 
settings, or it could develop as an abstraction of the faculty of recursion. In line with this 
proposal, the Mundurucus, speakers of a natural, recursive language with no exact numerical 
symbols,  possess  a  good  understanding  of  exact  equality  between  numbers,  but  their 
knowledge of the successor principle is at best limited.  
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Notes 
1 It is possible that the difficulty of the task was different here from the task used with 
children,  because  of  the  difference  in  the  methods.  For  the  Mundurucus,  stimuli  were 
presented as animations on a computer screen, instead of real objects. Furthermore, they had 
more trials to solve, and also these trials were shorter, with events succeeding to each other at 
a faster paste. 
2  The  expressions  constructed  by  double  reduplication  are  used  only  in  very  specific 
contexts, in activities which can be assimilated to word games.  
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